Introduction: Symbolic Nation-building and Collective Identities in Post-Yugoslav States by Vjeran Pavlaković
7
Introduction to Special Issue
Received: 15 March 2015




The bulk of the articles presented in this special issue were presented at the inter-
national conference “Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in South Eastern Eu-
rope”, held at the University of Rijeka 8-10 May 2014. This event concluded the 
three-year project led by Pål Kolstø from the University of Oslo and funded by the 
Norwegian Research Council, and featured over fifty participants from across Eu-
rope. One of the goals of the conference was to present the results of the project 
(http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/) and the ac-
companying volume of the same name published by Ashgate in 2014, which fo-
cused on nation-building in seven countries defined as the Western Balkans – Al-
bania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
The other goal of the conference was to encourage younger scholars to draw upon 
the quantitative results and explore topics beyond what the researchers on the pro-
ject were able to cover in a single edited volume. The large number of responses to 
the conference call yielded a final program featuring such diverse subjects as sports 
and nationalism, social cleavages and nation-building, the role of war crimes trials 
in shaping national narratives, and even the relationship between food and national 
identity. For this issue of Croatian Political Science Review, I selected those papers 
which focused on how collective remembrance, cultural landscapes, public space, 
and sites of memory function in the service of symbolic nation-building not only 
during socialist Yugoslavia, but especially in the new post-Yugoslav states.
The modern, if not to say postmodern, conditions under which the ongoing 
processes of nation-building in the Yugoslav successor states are unfolding have 
made symbols and rituals prominent tools in the hands of the nation-builders, argu-
ably more important now than in earlier generations. At the same time, the presence 
of strong narodi, replete with their historical and religious symbolism and rituals, 
means that the state leaders have at hand a reservoir of ready-to-use symbols that 
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may well be tempting to employ, but which do not resonate among all the citizens of 
the state, or at least not automatically. In Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in 
South Eastern Europe, we singled out four parameters of identity controversies and 
debates: religious culture, ethnic culture, historical imagination, and geographical 
imagination. Mapping the variations of nation-building projects was only the first 
step. Our next step was to measure the results of these strategies: do they have the 
desired effect, or are they a waste of effort? Relying on the quantitative research re-
sults of the project (conducted by IPSOS Strategic Marketing in 2011) along with 
a variety of interdisciplinary approaches, the project contributors discovered that 
whereas the citizens of some states have reached a consensus about the nation-
building project, other states remain fragmented and uncertain of when the process 
will end. In other words, how “loyal” were citizens to the new (or restored) symbol-
ic repositories elites in each successor state drew upon for political legitimacy. Cro-
atia and Kosovo scored the highest of the ex-Yugoslav states after waging bloody 
wars of independence, while the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed the 
lowest loyalty scores, clearly reflecting the completely fragmented political, social, 
and economic situation in that country.
As I argued in my chapter, the survey results for Croatia confirmed my initial 
hypotheses that the nation-building project was “successful” in the sense that there 
exists more or less a consensus over the country’s national symbols, borders, in-
terpretation of the war of independence (Domovinski rat, or Homeland War), and 
break with the Yugoslav past (Pavlaković, 2014). On 1 July 2013, Croatia became 
the twenty-eighth member of the European Union, fulfilling the country’s long-term 
goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. Although racing to join a multinational union 
only two decades after fighting a war to escape multinational Yugoslavia seems 
paradoxical in terms of a nation-building project, for Croatia’s political elite enter-
ing the EU confirmed the country’s place in Western civilization and represented 
a final break with the Balkans that had characterized the traumatic twentieth cen-
tury. Many political observers had expected EU membership to allow Croatia to 
shake off the negative legacies of the past and focus on jumpstarting the sluggish 
economy, reforming the bloated bureaucracy, and resolving the social crises fac-
ing the country. However, precisely the opposite took place; symbolic politics are 
seemingly stronger than ever. While the center-left government has been surpris-
ingly incompetent at adequately tackling burning economic problems, the opposi-
tion has systematically waged a campaign focusing on ideological and historical 
issues which seem anachronistic for an EU member state. The main opposition 
party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), has pushed issues such as political 
rituals (namely polemics over commemorations in Bleiburg and Vukovar), the use 
of Cyrillic script, lustration, alleged war crimes from the Second World War, strict 
interpretations of Croatian history, and most recently a marble bust of Josip Broz 
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Tito into the headlines instead of offering any kind of alternative socio-economic 
program. The recent demonstrations by segments of the veteran population echo 
the HDZ’s fear-mongering of resurgent communists, Yugoslavs, and Greater Ser-
bian aggressors, even though these seem absurd threats to a fully-fledged member 
of NATO in the twenty-first century. 
These worrying trends do, however, indicate that this research into the sym-
bolic strategies of nation-building remains absolutely relevant and that the post-Yu-
goslav societies will continue to feel the effects of the 1990s conflicts for decades, 
regardless of EU promises of a prosperous, harmonious, and stable future. Political 
elites (often supported by media corporations, religious community leaders, and 
intellectuals) throughout the region have clearly seen that framing contemporary 
problems as a continuity of historical victimization, ideological division, and the 
need for strengthening the “imagined community” ensures their grip on power and 
patronage systems. Moreover, the violence in eastern Ukraine also reveals many 
similarities with the war in Croatia in 1991, when intervention by the Yugoslav 
People’s Army was justified because of fears of alleged fascists from the Second 
World War. Thus this collection of articles offers an interdisciplinary look into the 
symbols, spaces, cultural artefacts, and monumental structures that serve as physi-
cal expressions of nation-building, whether pan-Yugoslav or post-Yugoslav ethno-
national states. 
Mark Wolfgram’s article opens the special issue with his thought-provoking 
comparative model on collective memory studies, drawing mostly upon his work 
on German cultural history but expanding it to include case studies from Spain, Ja-
pan, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia. Seeking to explain the process of collective 
memory formation, Wolfgram explores the various domestic cultural matrixes and 
external forces which influence how individuals construct various meanings from 
certain cultural objects that are a representation of the past. Most of his empirical 
data comes from analyzing television, film, radio, and theater productions in West 
Germany and how they dealt with difficult issues such as the Holocaust and Ger-
man guilt. Just as television documentaries and films allowed societies in Western 
Europe to begin an open dialogue about controversies from the past – such as the 
Vichy Regime’s participation in the Holocaust in France, German society’s culpa-
bility in the murder of Jews, or Francisco Franco’s dictatorship after the Spanish 
Civil War – provocative theater productions like Oliver Frljić’s Aleksandra Zec or 
the film Crnci deal with issues which politicians prefer to shy away from in Croa-
tia. Even though Wolfgram’s model is comparative, he reminds us that “memory 
needs to be studied in its social context”, and that factors such as generational trans-
mission of memories, family histories, and personal experiences shape collective 
remembrance regardless of top-down state initiatives in imposing hegemonic nar-
ratives of the past. 
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An example of this top-down, institutional construction of identity and nar-
rative is discussed in Marco Abram’s contribution about public space in Belgrade 
from 1944 to 1961. All of the values, ideologies, and images of the new communist 
regime were active in the reconstruction and expansion of Belgrade, which was to 
be a showcase and the capital of Yugoslav brotherhood and unity. All of the sym-
bolic strategies of nation-building observed after the 1990s – the changing of street 
names, construction of memorials, establishment of cultural institutions, and stag-
ing public celebrations – was present in socialist Belgrade, but with an emphasis 
on pan-Yugoslav multiculturalism. In addition to promoting the ideology of broth-
erhood and unity, the city was intended to demonstrate the success of Yugoslavia’s 
modernization, which is dealt with in greater detail in Brigitte Le Normand’s im-
pressive study of urban planning in Belgrade (2014). Even though Abram ends his 
study in the 1960s, it is already possible to see a tension between the Yugoslav and 
Serbian identity of Belgrade, since ultimately the city served as both a federal and 
republican capital. Although we can argue that a singular cultural landscape was 
never fully constructed anywhere in the former Yugoslavia, the drivers of the na-
tion-building projects in the 1990s understood that even this semi-formed Yugoslav 
collective identity needed to be erased in order to inscribe ethno-nationalist mean-
ings into the urban palimpsests of the new independent states.
Stevo Đurašković’s deconstruction of the political writings of Croatia’s first 
president, Franjo Tuđman, reveals a blueprint for a nation-building project that was 
ultimately realized in the 1990s. Unlike the many studies of Tuđman that include a 
discussion of his political career, Đurašković focuses exclusively on the historical, 
philosophical, and ideological elements of his writings prior to 1991. Tuđman’s ru-
minations on the nature of the Partisan struggle during the Second World War, the 
number of victims at the notorious Jasenovac concentration camp, and the “natural” 
borders of Croatia were developed in his books long before multiparty elections 
were on the horizon, but these are issues which continue to stir polemics in Croatian 
society. With hindsight after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, we can now see 
that Tuđman’s speculations about rejecting universal ideologies such as liberalism, 
strengthening national identity, and contemplating population exchanges as a way 
to ensure stable nation-states were not merely theoretical but part of a political plan. 
As the former president of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian 
Studies, Stephen E. Hanson, noted in his plenary address last year, “we can predict 
the behavior of people who are themselves dogmatically confident that they know 
what the future will hold... committed ideologues, it turns out, typically do just what 
they say they are going to do, for good or ill”.1
1 ASEEES NewsNet, January 2015, 55 (1): 4.
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So once the nation-building project is achieved, what to do with the common 
cultural heritage of the former state? This is the question posed in Marija Jauković’s 
article, which moves beyond the historical and political science disciplines and en-
gages with contemporary theories of cultural heritage preservation. She explores 
how the network of monuments and memorial complexes dedicated to the Partisan 
victory in the Second World War were imbued with shared meanings of the common 
struggle against fascist occupiers and domestic collaborators, and thus represent the 
cultural heritage of a state which no longer exists. Although in many cases the au-
thorities in the emerging nation-states have sought to inscribe new meanings into 
these monumental examples of socialist modernist architecture, there have been nu-
merous examples of memorials begin deliberately destroyed, defaced, or left to fall 
into disrepair, especially in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 Jauković offers a 
discussion of new trends in cultural heritage management and preservation that take 
advantage of virtual networks and transnational cooperation, in particular consi-
dering a growing international interest in socialist Yugoslavia’s monument heritage.
The contributions by Anida Sokol and Nicolas Moll provide complementary 
analyses that on the one hand reveal how dramatically divided the symbolic land-
scape of Bosnia and Herzegovina has become twenty years after the Dayton Ac-
cords ended the war, and on the other hand indicate that perhaps there are common 
historical symbols which can restore a sense of unity to the citizens of the country. 
The results of the Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building project explicitly demon-
strated how Bosnia and Herzegovina is fragmented by ethno-national and confes-
sional differences, which was further reflected by the lowest loyalty scores of all 
the countries under investigation (Dević, 2014). The numerous examples of war 
memorials, egregious use of religious symbols, and legal frameworks regulating the 
representation of the recent past provided by Sokol indicate that the elites in both 
the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska are actively perpetuating these 
divisions through symbolic nation-building strategies. In contrast to Croatia, where 
a general consensus around the Homeland War has resulted in a uniform memo-
ryscape of the 1990s conflict, in Bosnia and Herzegovina various interpretations of 
the war struggle for predominance in every town square, roadside marker, and me-
morial cemetery. Moll, while also recognizing the seemingly insurmountable chal-
lenges in finding any kind of common ground, suggests the 1984 Winter Olympics 
as a possible lieu de mémoire that could generate positive memories of what Bosnia 
and Herzegovina once was. 
In the final contribution, Denis Ermolin provides an ethnographic essay of a 
foreigner’s experiences in the radically transformed cultural landscape of Koso-
2 As James Young argues, new regimes almost always attempt to inscribe new meanings into the 
memorial leftovers of previous political systems (1993).
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vo’s capital, Pristina. Historical figures share prominent boulevards with kitschy 
monuments to foreign leaders such as US President Bill Clinton. Ermolin notes the 
contradiction in Kosovo’s proclaimed multiculturalism with the reality in the ur-
ban spaces and memorial complexes, which in fact celebrate only the cultural heri-
tage of the Albanian population. Kosovo’s remaining Serbs are relegated to tightly 
guarded enclaves or the area of land north of the Ibar River, where exclusively 
Serbian cultural and political symbols can be seen. Although aware of the vast gulf 
between the various ethnic groups in Kosovo following the atrocities committed 
during the 1990s, Ermolin nonetheless hopes that the future holds more mutual un-
derstanding which would then be reflected in the cultural landscape.
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